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From the sea change in U.S. television in the 1980s emerged a programming trend variously
described as "infotainment," "reality-based television," "tabloid TV," "crime-time television,"
"trash TV," and "on-scene shows."[1] The welter of terms created by television critics to
describe these new programs masked their underlying connection as a response to economic
restructuring within the industry. This essay offers a rough categorization of these programs,
sketches the industrial context from which they emerged, and points to the economic problems
they were meant to solve.[2] Although my focus here is on political economy, rather than on
textual or audience issues, I do not want to imply that these programs' cultural significance can
be reduced to their relations of production and distribution. Yet without understanding the
political-economic forces which drove the spread of this genre, textual and audience studies risk
reifying it as an expression of audience demand, or of their creators, or of a cultural, discursive,
or ontological shift unrelated to the needs of those who run the television industry. If this genre
exhibits a kind of textual excess, its emergence reflects a relative scarcity of means. I conclude
with suggestions for how textual and audience studies might link the new "reality" of television
to shifts in the larger U.S. political-economy since the mid-1980s.
Among the swirl of neologisms, my preferred term for these programs will be "Reali-TV,"[3]
which has the advantage of stressing the programming medium (versus "infotainment"), of
illuminating connections between seemingly different programs (such as "crime-time," "tabloid
TV" and "on-scene shows"), and of avoiding the high cultural bias implicit in the notion of "trash
TV." The term "Reali-TV" reminds us of the inseparability of "reality" and "television" in these
texts. It points to the overarching connections between these otherwise disparate textual forms,
which lie both in their distinctive claims to represent the real (and the need to interrogate those
claims), and their common impact on the realities of power and economic relations in the
industry. Reali-TV, then, is an umbrella term for a number of programming trends that have
rapidly expanded since the late 80s across all hours of network schedules, first-run syndication,
and cable.
Production practices common to these programs include the following:







extensive use of "actuality" footage of their subjects, whether these are police staking out
a drug den or Mom and Dad yukking it up in front of the camcorder;
reenactments of events, performed by professional actors, or by the people who
experienced them, or a mix of both;
a tendency to avoid the studio in favor of "on-scene" shooting, sometimes at the same
place where the events they represent occurred;
mixing footage shot by unpaid amateur videographers with that of professionals;
appealing to the conventions of "liveness," and "immediacy" through on-location
interviews, subjective camera work, and synchronized sound;
and appropriating traditional conventions of news coverage, such as the use of anchors or
hosts, remote reporting, and the pretense to "spontaneity."

These production techniques are combined differently in five formats of Reali-TV, which can be
distinguished according to how much each relies on nontraditional labor (for story development,
writing, performing, and camerawork) and production inputs (such as sets, props, and costumes.)
Two formats continue to depend mainly on professional labor and traditional inputs. First, the
network newsmagazines — whose ranks have swollen in the past few years with the introduction
of 48 Hours and Street Stories (CBS), Primetime Live (ABC), Dateline NBC, and others — are
still entirely professionally-produced and employ the same mix of studio and location footage as
the evening news. The same is true of tabloid TV shows (such as the syndicated A Current Affair
and its imitators), despite their different representational strategies. However, several other
formats use hybrid production techniques. Hidden video programs (such as Totally Hidden
Video), which enjoyed a minor resurgence in the early 1990s, rely on professional camera crews
and actors maneuvering unsuspecting non-professional performers into embarrassing or
humorous situations.
Crime-time and emergency response programs (Rescue 911, America's Most Wanted, Unsolved
Mysteries, and the many imitators these shows have spawned on cable and first-run syndication),
are shot and edited by professionals, and introduced by a regular host. Yet they also may employ
some amateur footage of disasters, and nonprofessional performers enacting their own rescues or
crime experiences. These programs also take advantage of props, sets, costumes, etc. provided by
law enforcement authorities, corrections institutions, parole boards, and emergency medical
crews. Finally, home video programs (such as America's Funniest Home Videos) rely on amateur
footage that is professionally edited. This format depends most heavily on nontraditional inputs
and amateur labor, not only for "scripting," performing and shooting the hijinks, but also to do
the work of studio audiences (who vote for the "funniest" video, for example). Before discussing
how these techniques have lowered production costs, we need to examine the larger economic
picture from whence they sprang.
DECLINE OF THE NETWORKS: WEBS WANE AS COMPETITION CLIMBS!
As a fiscal strategy, Reali-TV emerged in the late 1980s in response to the economic
restructuring of U.S. television. Much of the restructuring story has been told by scholars and in
the trade press: how the number of video distribution channels expanded rapidly, with the growth
of cable, VCRs, the Fox network, and local independent stations; how the television audience
was increasingly fragmented; how advertising revenues now had to be spread among a larger
pool of distributors; and how this dilution of advertising spending created pressure on
broadcasters and cablecasters to cut per-program production costs. Less cited causes for
production budget cuts included the high levels of corporate debt incurred by the big three
networks after each was sold in the mid-80s,[4] and advertiser-driven changes in audience
measurement techniques designed to identify specific market segments (most notorious was the
People-Meter, which yielded dramatically lower ratings for the networks[5]).
By the late 1980s, then, the economic picture of U.S. television had become decidedly more
crowded. If the networks remained in the foreground as the major economic force in the
industry, the purveyors of cable, VCRs, and first-run syndication winked and beckoned viewers
in the background. Advertisers and audience measurement services busily tried to record who
was watching what, how much attention they paid to the commercial breaks, and whether they
were buying any of it. However, to understand how Reali-TV emerged as a cost-cutting solution

in this new economic environment of the late 1980s, we need to examine how increased
competition in the distribution of television programming affected the sphere of production.
SQUEEZE ON PRODUCTION: OUCH! WEBS AND SUPPLIERS FEEL THE PINCH
As television distributors fought over smaller advertising shares, and shouldered more debt,
program producers (network production arms, major Hollywood studios, and the few small
independent production companies) all faced rapidly rising costs in the 1980s. For prime-time
producers, the average cost of an hour drama soared to over $1 million per episode by the end of
the decade, and costs were increasing by roughly 8%-10% a year.[6] Prices were driven up
primarily by "above the line" costs such as talent, direction, scriptwriting, music composition,
computer animation, and location costs.[7] The star system for above-the-line labor became
especially pronounced, as network programmers, agent-packagers, and production companies
responded to the greater risks of capital involved in creating new shows by increasingly
demanding names associated with prior success. Greater demand for stars created an artificial
labor shortage and inflated salaries for the lucky few.
These rising costs were accompanied by smaller per-show revenues, creating a squeeze on
production companies' earnings from both sides of the ledger. Producers were forced to accept
smaller license fees for their programs than they had commanded from the networks before the
new era of competition. The threatened networks were scaling back outlays, and pay-cable and
cable network distributors and syndicators also lacked deep pockets for program purchases. In
addition, changes in federal tax laws eliminated producers' investment tax credits, which often
meant the difference between earning a profit and taking a loss on a program.[8] By mid-decade,
caught between rising costs and lower network license fees, most producers could no longer
make back their investments in first-run network showings. By 1986, producers were losing up
to $100,000 per episode for half hour shows, and $200,000 to $300,000 for hour dramas.[9]
Producers now were forced to deficit-finance their programs and cross their fingers in hopes the
show would survive three network seasons, providing enough episodes for domestic and foreign
syndication and a chance to recoup their initial investments.
PRODUCERS TO LABOR: DROP DEAD
Feeling the squeeze on profits, production companies and the networks initiated a series of costcutting strategies that translated into an attack on labor, mainly on below-the-line workers such
as technicians, engineers, and extras. The first move was a wave of staff cutbacks at studios and
network news departments. In the mid-1980s, Fox cut 20% of its studio staff, Capital Cities/ABC
10% of its staff, CBS 30% of its administrative staff and 10% of its News Division. NBC
resisted a 17-week strike by the National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians
(NABET) in 1987, shedding 200 union jobs. By 1992, NBC had eliminated 30% of its News
Division through layoffs and bureau closings. Even network standards and practices
departments, much-derided self-censors of the broadcasting industry, faced the ax.[10]
The second part of the cost cutting strategy involved attempts to bypass union labor, spurring an
unprecedented wave of strikes by above- and below-line labor unions and craft guilds. In
addition to the NABET, the Directors Guild, the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), the
Screen Extras Guild (SEG), and American Federation of Radio and Television Artists (AFTRA)

all struck, while the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) struck twice, and the Writers Guild three times.
Above-the-line workers especially sought more residuals for the use of programs on new media
and overseas.[11] Lower paid labor, such as members of the Screen Extras Guild, took a more
defensive stand commensurate with their weaker bargaining power. The SEG strike ended with
union members accepting a 25% wage cut, changes in overtime schedules, and the acceptance of
producers' prerogative to hire more non-union labor. (The extras' bargaining position was hurt by
the Screen Actors Guild's refusal to merge with the less powerful union or even to support its
position in contract negotiations.) This increase in labor unrest was both a response to, and
motivating force, in attempts to break the power of the unions.
As a result, producers exacerbated the long-term split in the Hollywood labor market between
"core" workers (such as the successful SAG members who enjoy higher pay, more job security,
and who share management tasks and interests) and "periphery" workers (such as the SEG
members, who have little job security, work part-time schedules, and suffer lower wage
scales).[12] Producers also responded to union demands by using non-union Hollywood labor,
and shifting production to regions where cheaper labor was available, such as Canada and the
"right-to-work" states of the U.S. South.
These tactics cut across entertainment and news program production. Disney and MCA led the
industry shift toward building studio complexes in Florida. The loss of the investment tax credit,
which was only applicable to programs produced in the U.S., helped spur a shift of production to
Canada, where lower costs and more pliable unions could save $200,000 to $300,000 an episode
for dramatic series.[13] In news programming, CNN and Fox led the way in producing with
lower-paid, non-union labor and by breaking down job classifications, and their "success" was
increasingly imitated by the traditional networks. One former CBS executive noted that the
lesson of CNN was "Break the unions!"[14] NBC appears to have the learned the lesson
quickest, developing a 24 hour a day affiliate news service based in Charlotte, North Carolina
and staffed with non-union labor. Some Fox affiliates experimented with subcontracting their
entire evening newscasts.
EXTRA, EXTRA! REALI-TV FITS THE BILL
Reali-TV shows gained currency in this environment of relative financial scarcity and labor
unrest of the late 1980s. Economically, the genre fit the needs of producers and distributors alike
for cheaper programming. First, these programs largely did away with higher-priced stars and
union talent. The only "name" actors on these shows were briefly seen as hosts. In the crimetime/emergency shows, roles in reenactments of crimes and rescues were filled by unknown
actors and, sometimes, by the people the stories were based upon. In programs such as Cops,
segments followed law enforcement officials in the course of their work, eschewing
reenactments and the need for actors entirely. The home video and hidden video programs
likewise avoided professional union talent. In bypassing more expensive performers, the
programs' producers also escaped the grips of the Hollywood agents, who had come to occupy
the role of program developers and packagers in the early 1980s, and who exacted considerable
fees for their services.[15]
Producers of Reali-TV, particularly of the crime-time/ emergency shows and home and hidden
video programs, led a wider industry move toward using non-union, freelance production crews.

The Arthur Co. offers a good example. In 1987, it lost the rights to produce the network primetime drama Airwolf, after battling with the Writers Guild over cable royalties, then turned to
producing low budget, non-union programs for syndication and basic cable. In 1991, Arthur Co.
returned to primetime with FBI: the Untold Stories, a Reali-TV reprise of the bureau's longrunning romance with the tube. Similarly, Fox's America's Most Wanted, one of the trendsetters
of Reali-TV when it premiered in 1987, used different freelance crews for each segment. Even
some newsmagazines, such as CBS Street Stories, turned to freelance camera crews and news
producers. The home video programs relied on amateur camcorder enthusiasts and freelance
professionals. Reali-TV producers also partook of the move to cheaper labor regions. GrossoJacobson Entertainment, which has created more crime-time shows than any other production
house (including Top Cops, True Blue, and Secret Service), shot all of its patriotic paeans to U.S.
law enforcers in Toronto.[16]
The 1988 Writers' Strike, a twenty-two week affair which delayed the opening of the fall season,
was crucial for the rise of Reali-TV. Existing Reali-TV shows were largely unaffected by the
strike, since they already relied very little on writers. In addition, the delay of the season gave
producers and programmers the impetus to develop future shows which did not depend on
writing talent. Tabloid TV pioneer Peter Brennan (of Hard Copy), when asked whether he was
concerned about a potential SAG strike in 1992, shrugged off the threat: "Remember the Writers
Guild strike in '88?...that was the year that gave rise to reality TV."[17]
Reali-TV programs also cut costs by wholeheartedly embracing low-end production values.
Direct cinema techniques such as handheld cameras and the use of available lighting made shows
without reenactments (such as Cops and the network newsmagazines) particularly cheap.
Programs that employ reenacted material (such as Rescue 911 and Unsolved Mysteries) often
avoid traditionally painstaking lighting and make-up to approximate the "real" look of direct
cinema footage, and its relatively low production costs. Although the reenactments may require
some expenses for on-location shooting, going on-scene is often less costly than renting studio
space. In addition, crime-time and emergency shows have minimized costs of sets, props, and
costumes by convincing the agencies they profile to donate police cars, equipment, and even
uniforms for the production crew, so they can pass for police at a crime scene.[18] Finally,
research and logistical costs for most categories of Reali-TV shows are tempered by the
information subsidies traditionally extended to the news and entertainment media by public
relations operatives hoping to plant favorable stories about their government agency, medical
technology, legal clients, etc.[19]
As a result of their shoestring production budgets, primetime Reali-TV shows enjoy the
distinction of recouping their makers' investments from network license fees alone. With rare
exceptions, Reali-TV is the only prime-time programming category which is not deficit-financed
(see table 1, which is based on production costs for a representative season.) Reali-TV also
enjoys success in the low-fee first run syndication and made-for-cable fields; the growth of
copycat Reali-TV shows has occurred primarily in these markets.
FINANCE AND SYNDICATION: REALI-TV RIGHT FOR FYNSIN FIGHT
A changing regulatory climate also contributed to the economic advantages of Reali-TV. In
1970, amid concerns about network power over production companies, the FCC barred the

networks from owning a financial interest in, and retaining syndication rights to, most primetime
entertainment programming (daytime shows, sports, and news were not affected.) The financial
and syndication, or "finsyn," rules also limited the number of hours of primetime shows the
network could produce. A 1980 consent decree in an antitrust case further limited network
primetime entertainment production to 2.5 hours per week for several years. When the FCC
enacted the finsyn rules, its stated goals were to encourage local programming and small
independent producers. In regard to the latter aim, the FCC hoped that if network production
were reined in, other producers might create more innovative, diverse programming. But the
small independents have not flourished, as the large capital investments and risks required of
program producers meant that Hollywood studios with substantial financing would control the
field. As with the small independents in the film industry, television's smaller production houses
depend on winning network contracts for their programming before they can secure bank
financing to make it.[20] Independents thus have not enjoyed a great deal of financial or creative
power over the development of new programming, especially when compared with the major
studios or the top agent-packagers. In many ways, the same relations hold true in first-run
syndication and the made-for-cable markets. Here, the small independents are often financed by
the big multi-system operators (such as Time-Warner) and the dominant distribution companies
(including those run by major studios) in exchange for syndication rights.
Throughout the 1980s, the networks challenged the finsyn rules, arguing that they were no longer
in a position to dominate program distribution as they had before the spread of cable and VCRs,
and that they needed to be allowed to compete internationally in the global television market. In
1991 the FCC allowed the networks to finance and syndicate their own in-house or co-produced
programs, and to negotiate for the rights to some outside-produced shows. A long series of
appeals by Hollywood studios and independent producers was exhausted by 1994, and the finsyn
rules were repealed.
Although Fox has been unaffected by the finsyn rules and has always produced the bulk of its
programming in house,[21] the three major networks may very well have anticipated the repeal
of these restrictions and positioned themselves to syndicate Reali-TV programming domestically
and abroad. One of the striking characteristics of primetime Reali-TV programs is that so many
of them are network productions or co-productions (see table 1). This is true not only of the
network newsmagazines, which are produced by their news divisions, but also of crimetime/emergency response and the home video shows. As producers and co-producers of the
shows, networks can retain the rights to distribute them under the new rules.
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: IT'S A REAL, REAL, REAL, REAL WORLD
Producers and network investors have also been attracted to Reali-TV because of its ability to
sell abroad. Since primetime Reali-TV earns back its production costs with the first U.S. network
showing, any further syndication represents pure profit. U.S. Reali-TV has been sold overseas
using two methods. Some shows are licensed outright to foreign broadcasters, the way most U.S.
programming traditionally has been marketed. Episodes of top-rated network crime-time/
emergency programs Unsolved Mysteries and Rescue 911 have been sold abroad in this manner.
One international program distributor claims,

The easiest and most profitable thing for a distributor to do with reality shows is to
license them as they are. Prices can even approach what distributors get for actionadventure hours in some territories."[22] By 1991, Rescue 911 could be seen in
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden; Unsolved Mysteries was available in Canada, Spain,
France, and Japan.
However, many more shows have been formatted because of their topical or local nature. This
method involves selling or licensing the program's concept for local production with local
subjects. U.S. program footage may be sold as well to supplement the local version. As Asu
Aksoy and Kevin Robins note, the challenge for contemporary media distributors
"is to transcend vestigial national difference and to create standardized global markets,
whilst remaining sensitive to the peculiarities of local markets and differentiated
consumer segments."[23]
Reali-TV has participated in this strategy of "global localization." Fremantle, a distributor of
game shows and Candid Camera, provides a good example of how formatting works.
Fremantle's C.E.O. maintains that the company
"operates in foreign markets like McDonald's does...There are Fremantle subsidiaries in
some countries; in others there are franchise-holders who produce their own local
versions of the original product."[24]
Home and hidden video shows tend to be formatted rather than licensed, allowing foreign
broadcasters to insert their own clips into the programs. Crime-time shows have also been
formatted: the Swedes have developed a version of Cops, and America's Most Wanted was
transformed into the short-lived Australia's Most Wanted some years back. Tabloid TV programs
also have been formatted or customized because they tend to be the most indigenous. Notes one
executive producer, "In syndication, shows tend to be more topical and current...but they have to
be more timeless for that backend revenue."[25]
Reali-TV's growth abroad has been aided by the widespread movement to privatize and
deregulate broadcasting. As one distributor puts it:
"With some exceptions, public service broadcasters have always kept a tight lid on the
definition of reality...The taste (for Reali-TV) has been stimulated abroad by increased
commercialism, but reality shows haven't yet taken hold en masse...But because foreign
broadcasters are tight for money, the attraction of reality will no doubt be
considerable."[26]
Although both private and public broadcasters have purchased Reali-TV, the genre's growth is
especially symptomatic of the need for public broadcasters increasingly to operate according to
the logic of private channels, as competition for audiences and funding mounts.[27] In addition,
the explosion of distribution channels in the 1980s was not only an U.S. phenomenon, but a
global one; hence, some of the same cost pressures encountered by U.S. producers are being felt
abroad. To better adapt to the globalizing television market, some Reali-TV has been conceived
for international audiences first. Time-Warner/HBO's World Entertainment Report, for example,

was pre-licensed across Europe, Australia, and Japan. The program has a modular format which
broadcasters can recompose to fit their needs, inserting local entertainment coverage if desired.
In 1992, Talbot TV was planning Inside Interpol, the ultimate in global crime-time, involving
reenactments of crimes handled by the international investigative agency.
The international spread of Reali-TV cannot be explained as the outcome of U.S. product
innovation, since many European and Japanese programs pre-dated their U.S. counterparts. The
top-rated U.S. tabloid, A Current Affair, was developed in Australia 20 years ago. Crimewatch
UK, which reconstructs crimes and asks for viewers' assistance, preceded America's Most
Wanted and Unsolved Mysteries, as did a similar Dutch program. An Italian game show that
features couples airing their grievances against each other with the support of invited friends (a
studio audience votes for the "winner") has been formatted for U.S. audiences. These transborder
flows suggest that programs that appear to be products of rapid U.S. innovation when glimpsed
from the national perspective are actually the result of an international circulation, and
recirculation, of products through globalized media markets.
For example, the widely-formatted America's Funniest Home Videos was itself inspired by
segments of the Japanese variety show Fun Television with Kato-chan and Ken-chan, which
broadcasts humorous videos sent in by viewers. King World's revival of Candid Camera for
foreign and domestic syndication, an attempt to capitalize on the success of America's Funniest
Home Videos, similarly suggests that there is as much recycling of program formats as rapid
innovation at work here. If U.S. television has always mixed the shock of the new with the
familiarity of the formulaic, Reali-TV seems to indicate that U.S. producers are looking further
abroad for "new" ideas, then repackaging them for domestic and international audiences. To the
extent that the spread of the genre represents a "victory" for U.S-based media producers, it is a
packaging and marketing triumph.
CONCLUSION: WHAT PRICE REALITY?
U.S. television underwent a dramatic restructuring in the 1980s, largely precipitated by changing
patterns of distribution with the spread of cable and VCRs. As the networks' oligopolistic control
over the distribution of television programming was challenged, audience ratings shares
fragmented. Producers faced smaller license and syndication fees from an expanded customer
base, which now included not only the networks, but local independent stations, cable networks
and superstations, and first-run distributors. Confronted with rapidly rising above-the-line
production costs, producers took it out on below-the-line labor, and sought cheaper forms of
programming. Reali-TV fit the bill. Networks stepped in to produce what examples of this
programming the FCC would allow (news magazines for the big three, all forms for Fox) and coproduced what kinds they were not permitted to own and syndicate under the finsyn rules,
hoping they would be in a better position to negotiate for ownership rights when the rules were
repealed. Reali-TV made a splash in Europe and Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well,
but many U.S. programs of this kind that were licensed and formatted abroad drew on foreign
models in the first place. Thus, we should understand Reali-TV not merely as a radical generic
innovation but as a recirculation of product among global media corporations.
By the beginning of the 1994 television season, there were signs that this programming trend was
leveling off in the U.S., at least on primetime network schedules, if not in first-run

syndication.[28] Whereas 14 such series were developed for the 1992-93 season, only six were
trickling down the pipe for 1994-95. There were a number of reasons for the decline. First, the
tabloid shows failed to compete with game shows on the basis of production costs and
ratings.[29] Second, television programmers' famous taste for imitation meant that their
schedules were already saturated with Reali-TV. Third, just as the networks seemed assured of a
total repeal of the finance and syndication rules, Reali-TV was garnering disappointingly low
profits in off-network syndication markets, suggesting that the genre's topicality and timeliness
made it less attractive to audiences the second time around.[30] Finally, advertisers were also
growing wary of the genre. In part, advertisers became concerned about associating their
products with the sexual and violent content in some programs of this ilk. More important, RealiTV was not attracting enough affluent eighteen to thirty-five year olds, appealing more to preteens, seniors, and low-income viewers. These demographics forced the networks to sell
advertising time on many Reali-TV shows at a discount compared with other programs with
similar ratings and shares.
Nonetheless, Reali-TV is still with us, and continues to raise questions for television studies. Let
me suggest briefly how we might draw connections between this genre and recent politicaleconomic and cultural developments in U.S. life. The rise of the "crime-time/emergency
services" programs, in particular, is clearly related to the increasing law and order conservatism
of the past ten years. Whether the relationship is more one of agenda-setting or cultural
reflection, these programs are closely linked to the growing needs of state agencies to foreground
and manage their public images in hopes of attracting resources in an era of budget deficits; to
the public relations activities of those who would privatize prisons; to the need to legitimate an
unprecedented growth in the number of incarcerated Americans, thanks to the "War on Drugs"
and mandatory sentencing laws; and, following the Rodney King video, to a need to excuse the
new visibility of (the same old) police brutality.
Many Reali-TV programs are produced by former law enforcement officers, and most have
fulltime police consultants. Debra Seagal, a former tape logger for American Detective, has
recently described how producers of the now-defunct program routinely excised scenes of police
brutality or trampling on the civil rights of suspects.[31] Mary Beth Oliver has shown that, like
most television, these shows massively over-represent violent crimes (murder, rape, assault)
versus crimes against property.[32] The greatest irony of the crime-time shows is that, in an
industry that argues vehemently against government censorship of sex and violence, every
episode of Cops is vetted by police before airing to ensure "accurate portrayals" of police work.
Those who celebrate television texts as inspiring an active, participatory viewership that is
inherently progressive or popular need to confront the "active viewer" brought forth by crimetime programs. Among the most active are those viewers who respond to televised appeals to
help law enforcement by dialing up hotlines to report sightings of fugitives and runaways. Aside
from providing another information subsidy to the producers (who routinely air their tally of
fugitives the program has helped to arrest, and follow-up stories on them), the solicitation of tips
fosters a surveillance mentality. This kind of audience activity is not devoted to negotiating or
resisting the dominant ideology in the text, but to embracing and acting upon it wholeheartedly.
That some fugitives portrayed have not been formally charged with a crime, and have a right to
freedom from prejudicial pre-trial publicity, as well as to privacy, is not often mentioned on
these hunt-a-thons.

Reali-TV has also played a role in the redefinition of public service programming. In the
Reagan-Bush climate of lax regulation, programmers did not need to fear FCC scrutiny of the
violence and sexual content of Reali-TV, avoiding the costs of in-house standards and practices
departments' close screening of these programs, and potential legal costs of defending them
before the FCC. In addition, many Reali-TV producers recast broadcasters' "public service" and
"educational" responsibilities to champion the civic value of their programs. Producers ignored
traditional definitions of serving the public interest, which focused more on the discussion of
public affairs, coverage of local issues, and developing children's intellectual or emotional
abilities. Instead, the creators of crime-time programs in particular touted their public
contribution as prompting citizens to help law enforcement officers track down their quarry. The
executive producer of America's Most Wanted opined to The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin:
"I believe we are witnessing the birth of a new era in citizen involvement. America's Most
Wanted has organized some 22 million viewers into the first nationwide neighborhood
watch association."[33]
In this vision of public service, surveillance of criminals replaces debate over public affairs, an
oxymoronic "nationwide neighborhood watch association" offers a false sense of localism, and
education is reduced to instructing viewers on how to avoid becoming a crime victim.
If there is a master trope for each Reali-TV format — crime time/emergency, home video,
hidden video, tabloid, and newsmagazine — it may be participatory democracy. Popular
participation in television programming is represented through Reali-TV's widespread use of
hotlines which beckon viewers to participate in law enforcement as detectives or judges of
others' guilt, through its celebration of a (highly professionally-constructed) amateur aesthetic in
the increasing use of home video, through its offers to nonprofessionals to perform on camera,
and through its claims of "democratizing" taste in news. Hence, Reali-TV is a critical site for
engaging the central questions for contemporary television studies. When does the aesthetic of
the popular become an administered populism? When is the popular reactionary? On whose
terms are we allowed to participate in television production? Enquiring minds want to know.

NOTES
1. Thanks to Rick Maxwell, Chuck Kleinhans, and David Tetzlaff for their comments on earlier
versions of this essay.
2. Given space limits, I restrict my discussion to the distinctive political-economy of primetime
series, putting aside made-for-tv docudramas and entire cable channels (such as Court TV) which
may share similar production practices and genres.
3. The earliest use of this term I have encountered is in Ed Siegel, "It's Not Fiction. It's Not
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Table 1. Prime-Time Reali-TV Programs at the Start of 1991-92 Season
Program

Network Mins

Producers

Deficit

America's Funniest
Home Videos

ABC

30 ABC/Vin di Bona

$0

$375,000

America's Funniest
People

ABC

30 ABC/Vin di Bona

$0

$300,000

American Detective

ABC

30 ABC/Orion TV/
Paul Stojanovich

$0

$450,000

FBI: The Untold
Stories

ABC

30

$25,000

$450,000

Primetime Live

ABC

60 ABC News

$0

$500,000

20/20

ABC

60

ABC News

$0

$500,000

48 Hours

CBS

60 CBS News

$0

$500,000

Rescue 911

CBS

30 CBS/Arnold Shapiro

$0

$650,000

60 Minutes

CBS

60

CBS News

$0

$600,000

Top Cops

CBS

60

CBS News

$0

$650,000

Exposé

NBC

30

NBC News

$0

$300,000

Real Life With
Jane Pauley

NBC

30

NBC News

$0

$300,000

Unsolved Mysteries

NBC

60

Cosgrove-Meurer

$0

$800,000

America's Most
Wanted

Fox

60

STF Productions

$0

$500,000

Cops

Fox

30

Barbour-Langley/
Fox TV Stations

$0

$325,000

Cops II

Fox

30

Barbour-Langley/
Fox TV Stations

$0

$325,000

Totally New Totally
Hidden Video

Fox

30

STF Productions

$0

$500,000

The Arthur Co.

License Fee per Episode

Source: Variety, August 26, 1991, 48-54

